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Water shortages in important grain-producing regions of China may significantly affect China’s
agricultural production potential and international markets.  Falling ground-water tables and
disruption of surface-water deliveries to important industrial and agricultural regions have
provoked concern that a more dramatic crisis is looming unless effective water conservation
policies can be put into place rapidly.  While China’s water use is unsustainable in some areas,
there is substantial capacity to adapt and avert a more serious crisis.  Recent changes in water
management policies may serve to bring about more effective water conservation.  Since China
is the world’s largest producer and consumer of wheat and cotton, and production of both these
crops depends heavily on supplemental irrigation in northern China, the success or failure of
these reforms could have significant implications for international markets.
This paper provides an overview of how water scarcity could affect China’s agricultural
production and trade.  The paper identifies the areas where available water resources are most
overexploited and the crops most vulnerable to reductions in irrigation. Reviewing the limited
work on the impact of water scarcity on agricultural production and trade in China, we comment
on the results and the shortcomings of these studies.  We present preliminary results from
modeling a decline in irrigated land in water scarce areas in China and the effect this would have
on China’s production and trade.  Finally, we describe recent conservation policies and how
these may affect crop production in China.Water Scarcity and Irrigated Agriculture in China
China is moderately endowed with water but water in China is unevenly distributed
geographically.  With annual per-capita water resources of nearly 2200 m
3, China has roughly
one quarter the world average, but well above water scarce endowment levels which tend to
range between 1,500-1,700 m
3 per capita for moderate water scarcity (Liu, 1998).  China’s
water, however, is disproportionately distributed in areas south of and including the Chang
(Yangtze) River Basin.  The productive agricultural areas in northern China have roughly one
quarter of the water that the south has.  Water shortages are particularly severe in the Hai, Huang
(Yellow), and Huai River Basins (World Bank, 2002).  Water shortages in the lower reaches of
the Huai River Basin can be partly alleviated by a south-north water diversion project in Jiangsu
Province that brings water from the Chang (Yangtze) River up into northern Jiangsu.
The Hai River Basin is an area where water shortages are known to be severe.  The Hai River
Basin roughly adheres to the boundaries of Hebei Province and refers to a number of tributaries
that flow into a short sea channel in Tianjin known as the Hai River.  Underlying this surface
water structure is a complex set of overlapping aquifers, with varying recharge rates.  A major
reason why water resources in the Hai River Basin are in decline is because it is the site of two
metropolises, Beijing and Tianjin, and several smaller cities.
1  These urban areas are drawing
down the groundwater table at alarming rates and many have experienced land subsidence as a
result.  In addition, irrigated area has increased over the last 40 years due to widespread
establishment of tubewells powered by electric or diesel pumps.  The expansion of irrigation not
                                                
1 In addition to Beijing (population 13 million) and Tianjin (population 9 million), there are three other cities with
populations over 1 million and five with populations between 500,000 and 1 million in the basin.only has allowed for higher yields, but also allows farmers to double crop, generally winter
wheat followed by corn.  The area became a major wheat-producing region as irrigated area
increased.  Extensive irrigation, coupled with urban and industrial demand for water, have drawn
down the water tables throughout the basin at increasing rates, exceeding three meters per year in
some rural regions in the 1990s (Wang and Huang, 2002).  Surface water is also overexploited.
Cangzhou, a downstream prefecture in Hebei Province, receives less than 10 percent of the
surface water deliveries than it did in the 1970s (Lohmar and Crook, 2002).
Water resources in the Yellow River Basin are also showing signs of overexploitation.  The
Yellow River meanders from its headwaters on the edge of the Tibeten Plateau in Qinghai
Province, turns north through the steppe and desert provinces of Gansu, Ningxia and Inner
Mongolia, turns south along the Shaanxi and Shanxi border, then turns east again and towards
the ocean through northern Henan and Shandong provinces.  Since the early 1970s, water in the
Yellow River is often drawn off to such an extent that the river does not flow into the ocean for
part of the year.  In 1997 and 1998, overexploitation was particularly acute, the river did not
reach the ocean for over 220 days in both years, and the dry stretch reached as far as 700
kilometers inland (Liu, 1998; Liu, 1999).  When this happens, farmers in the productive
downstream provinces of Shandong and Henan, are denied surface water for part of the irrigation
season.
It is important to note that losing irrigation does not affect all crops equally.  Precipitation on the
North China Plain is unevenly distributed throughout the year, with 70 percent of the rainfall
arriving in the three-month period from July-September.  Single season corn can be grown in thisperiod without supplemental irrigation.  Irrigation, however, allows farmers to double crop,
usually winter wheat followed by corn, and still realize satisfactory yields.  Winter wheat is
irrigated roughly 4-5 times, once in the fall after planting, then 3-4 times in the spring when
rainfall is low, and is harvested in June.  If rainfall is still low after planting corn in late June, and
water is available, farmers may irrigate corn to get the seedlings started, but the bulk of corn
production occurs during the period with adequate rainfall.  Cotton in the North China Plain is
usually a single season crop that also relies on supplemental irrigation in the spring, but can
withstand a dry spell before the rainy season, when the important flowering period begins.
Surface water deliveries are most unreliable during the high irrigation season of May-June.
Implications for Agricultural Production
There are a few published estimates of how water shortages will affect agricultural production in
China (Table 1).  Modeling approaches vary in these estimates and include a hydro-climatic
approach (Heilig et. al., 2000), a hydrological-economic approach with varying water prices
(Rosegrant and Cai, 2002), and extrapolation of water use and water efficiency trends (Yang and
Zehlner, 2000).  In addition, the results vary widely, even within the same study.  For example,
Heilig et. al. predict that at current level of water use efficiency, China’s grain production will
fall short of projected demand in 2025 by 156 mmt, but that with increased efficiency, grain
production can exceed projected demand by 22 mmt in that year.  Rosegrant and Cai’s results
show a more moderate effect.  They predict that China will import 47.2 mmt of grain in 2025 as
a baseline and this figure rises to 56.7 mmt under a scenario where water prices are tripled.Under a scenario where water use efficiency increases in addition to the higher water prices,
imports fall back to below the baseline, to 46.3 mmt.
While these studies provide insight into how China’s agricultural sector may respond to water
shortages, there are a number of shortcomings with the analysis.  One is they all provide long-
term projections of China’s agricultural supply and demand.  Such long-term projections are
difficult to rely upon, indeed, in 1977, no one would have predicted that China would be a net
corn exporter in 2002.  In addition, these studies generally take China as a whole, but water
scarcity is very much a regional phenomenon.  Water scarcity affects northern China’s wheat,
corn and cotton growing regions.  In southern China, where nearly all of China’s rice is
produced, flood control and drainage are the major water related problems, not water scarcity.
Indeed, projects to transfer water from the south to the north are one means China is pursuing ot
relieve water shortages in the north.
An additional shortcoming in some of these studies is that they aggregate grains together which
conceals an important underlying dynamic driven by income growth and urbanization.  Rising
incomes and urbanization are generating more diversified diets in China, increasing the
consumption of livestock products, fruits and vegetables, while decreasing per capita
consumption of staple grains such as wheat.  Thus, demand for feed grains such as corn is
expected to rise dramatically over the next few decades as China’s per capita consumption of
livestock products approaches that of Taiwan or other wealthier Asian countries.  Conversely,
consumers in China are eating less staple food grains, such as wheat, as they diversify their diets.
Corn, however, is less threatened by unreliable irrigation because it is grown in the rainy season,while wheat relies heavily on supplemental irrigation.  In addition, demand for cotton in China is
expected to increase as the Multi-Fiber Agreement ends in 2005, but cotton is rarely considered
in estimates of water scarcity and agricultural trade.
To address some of these concerns, we estimated the effects of a decrease in irrigated area using
the China model that is incorporated in to the USDA Country-Commodity Linker System
(CCLS).  The CCLS is a partial equilibrium model used to provide the annual USDA Baseline
projections.  The model solves for international supply and demand for 24 commodities in 42
countries and regions (see appendix 1).  This allows us to determine how different crops, and
international markets for each crop, are affected by water shortage scenarios.  The China model
is disaggregated into six regions, and we focus on the northern region which include five
agricultural provinces (Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi) as well as two metropolitan centers
(Beijing and Tianjin).  This region is where agricultural production is most threatened by water
scarcity and is the site of 57 percent, 38 percent and 38 percent of China’s wheat, corn and cotton
production respectively (NBS, 2002).
Using the ERS China model and CCLS, we estimated three different scenarios of water scarcity.
2
The scenarios are based on assumptions of decreasing irrigation water available for wheat, corn,
and cotton production in the three provinces of Hebei, Shandong and Henan.  Hebei province
nearly matches the watershed of the overexploited Hai River Basin, while Shandong and Henan
are large agricultural provinces on the downstream end of the Yellow River Basin where
                                                
2 The three scenarios are:  1) Hebei loses 10 percent of its irrigated acreage; 2) Hebei loses 20 percent of its irrigated
acreage and Shandong loses 10 percent and; 3) Hebei loses 30 percent of its irrigated acreage, Shandong loses 20
percent and Henan loses 10 percent.  See Appendix 2 for more details on how we constructed these scenarios.disruptions in the flow have led to unreliable water deliveries. These scenarios conform to the
severity of water shortages in these three large grain-growing provinces are intended to represent
a shock to the model, rather than a real fall in irrigated area over a specified period.  The fall in
irrigated area in these scenarios, however, is not an entirely unrealistic expectation.  Researchers
and policymakers inside and outside of China argue for substantially reducing irrigated area in
the Hai River Basin in order to reverse the rapid fall in the groundwater tables.  Over-expoitation
of the Yellow River has caused widespread disruption in irrigation water deliveries in Shandong
Province in the recent past, and these disruptions were worsening through the 1990s.  The total
decrease in irrigated area for wheat, corn and cotton under these scenarios are reported in table 2.
The three scenario shocks are incorporated into the model (appendix 2) and results from the
scenario runs are compared to the 2003 Baseline projections to determine how water scarcity
may impact agricultural production and trade.  The model produces 10-year projections of supply
and demand for the included commodities.  Because we are interested in how the scenario shocks
cause farmers to move out of crops that rely on irrigation and how these changes affect
production generally, we average the changes over the 2003-2007 marketing years.  This is
similar to how other scenario experiments with the CCLS model are reported (Lohmar, Hansen,
Seeley and Hsu, 2002).
Our results indicate that water shortages have a significant affect on the production of these
important commodities, but that the affect on trade will be significantly influenced by trade
liberalization policies.  As predicted, wheat is the most affected crop, with production falling
7.75 mmt (7.5 percent) under scenario 3, the most severe water shortage scenario (Table 3).  Thiscompares to a decrease of 4 percent and 1.2 percent for cotton and corn respectively under
scenario 3.
Imports, however, do not respond to the fall in production as would be expected if there were
perfect integration between international markets and China’s domestic markets.  For example,
for wheat, net imports rise by 2.2 mmt under scenario 3, far short of the 7.8 mmt fall in
production.  Instead, consumers absorb most of the shock, reducing consumption by 5.6 mmt
under scenario 3.  This pattern is true for corn as well, where consumption falls by 1.1 mmt and
net imports rise by only 0.5 mmt to accommodate a 1.6 mmt production shortfall under scenario
3.  Cotton, however, is more responsive to international markets, with imports rising by 134 tmt
as production falls by 194 tmt under scenario 3.  In addition to a fall in consumption, the stocks
for these three commodities are also drawn down in response to the higher prices that stem from
the production shortfall.
China’s poor price transmission can be seen in how domestic prices respond compared to
international prices.  Focusing again on scenario 3, domestic prices rise dramatically for wheat
and cotton (but not so much for corn – table 4).  For wheat, domestic farm prices rise by 18
percent and consumer prices rise by over 16 percent.  But the international price for wheat only
rises by roughly one percent.  Thus, under these scenarios, consumers reduce their consumption
more and production decreases less than if the price increases were dampened by increasing
imports.  The story is similar for cotton, where consumer and producer prices increase by almost
7 percent, but international prices rise only 1.3 percent.  If China was more integrated into
international agricultural markets, then domestic prices would not rise so dramatically, and thiscould lead to imports larger than the falls in production that result form these scenarios.  This is
because, under the poor price transmission, farmers outside the water scarce areas increase
production of the water sensitive crops as the prices rise, an effect that would be dampened by
imports under a more liberal trade regime.
The Role of Water Policy Reform
China has responded to the threat of severe water shortages by promoting water conservation at
all levels of water management and the success or failure of these efforts will have significant
implications for agricultural production in the future.  As part of a national increase in
infrastructure investment, China has significantly increased spending on water conservancy
infrastructure such as wastewater treatment facilities and maintenance of aging irrigation
infrastructure (Lohmar, et. al., 2003).  In addition, policymakers are promoting a variety of water
policy reforms that are sometimes tied to investment funds.  Water policy reforms include
reforms of river basin management, reforms of irrigation district management, and reform of
water prices and other means to give producers an incentive to adopt water saving practices.  The
success of these reforms, however, will likely have different effects on China’s agricultural
production.
For example, the successful reform of water management at the river basin level will improve
irrigation reliability in productive grain growing regions.  This, in turn, will increase China’s
capacity to produce crops such as wheat and cotton that rely on supplemental irrigation in water
stressed regions.  Current policy reforms to improve river basin management include increasingthe regulatory authority of the National River Basin Commissions (there are 7 NRBCs in China,
one for each of China’s major river basins) so that they have more power to enforce provincial
withdrawal limits.  The Yellow River flowed to the ocean every day in year 2000, an event
largely credited to this policy.  China is currently considering a system of water withdrawal
rights along river basins, so that provinces can trade these rights among themselves and result in
a more economically efficient allocation of water.  However, determining how these rights are
initially allocated and the mechanism of exchanging and enforcing them are, understandably,
contentious issues and have yet to be established.
Another set of reforms being established are irrigation management reforms.  These include
establishing water user associations and contracting the management of lateral canals to
individual entrepreneurs, along with a variety of other types of management reform.  The
reforms have been adopted in some areas more than other and their effectiveness varies as well
(Wang, Xu, Huang and Rozelle, 2003).  While these efforts generally increase the reliability of
water deliveries and ensure the users at the downstream end of the irrigation system receive their
share of the water, the main focus is usually to reduce water consumption while maintaining
yields.  Thus, by themselves, these reforms will not likely result in an increase in aggregate
agricultural production.  Coupled with river basin transfers, however, they could play an
important role by maintaining agricultural production in areas that will lose access to water in
such transfers, which will free up water for delivery to more productive regions.
Finally, water prices are being reformed in an effort to increase farmers’ incentive to use water
more conservatively.  This reform effort, however, will likely take place over a longer term fortwo reasons.  One is that the reform is politically controversial because increasing water prices
goes against another important and sensitive policy goal:  increasing farm incomes.  Another
reason, and perhaps the more important of the two, is the high costs involved in establishing and
managing a system where farmers pay for water according to the volume of water they use.
With over 200 million farm households each farming several small plots of land, it will be very
costly to measure and monitor volumetric deliveries to each plot.  Thus, a variety of second-best
solutions will likely be established prior to volumetric pricing.
While the reform of water prices will likely take a long time to work through, the success of
these efforts may have a more profound impact on China’s agricultural production than the other
types of reforms.  As farmers become more sensitive to the costs of their water consumption,
they will seek ways to increase the value of the water they use.  This likely will involve moving
into high-value cash crops as the case in other water stressed agricultural regions such as
California’s Central Valley.  High-value fruits and vegetables often are water intensive, but they
are also well- suited to production using sophisticated water-saving irrigation technologies, more
so than field crops such as wheat.  In addition, such crops are usually labor intensive, and China
is a relatively labor abundant agricultural economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  Thus, stronger
incentives to use water more economically at the farm level, coupled with increasing integration
into international markets, may play a significant role in China’s overall agricultural
transformation. With a more liberalized trade regime, China may well become an exporter of
labor intensive crops and an importer of land intensive crop that can be grown in areas where
water resources are less stressed.  Under this scenario, water shortages will be part of the process
that transforms China’s rural economy.Conclusion
Over-exploitation of water resources and the changes brought about to adapt to limited water
resources will almost certainly induce changes in China’s agricultural production patterns.  In
creasing urban demand for water as well as demand for environmental flows will limit the
amount agriculture can continue to draw off the water system in important grain producing areas
of northern China.  But many of these areas have seen dramatic increases in grain production due
to the establishment of irrigation systems over the last 50 years.  With irrigation now threatened
and policy no longer focused on providing cheap irrigation to maintain grain self-sufficiency,
changes in agricultural production are likely to occur.  Given China’s size and importance in the
world food system, these changes will likely affect international markets.
The magnitude of the changes on international markets depends on a variety of factors.  The
success and effectiveness of water policy changes to currently being promoted will make a
difference.   If effective policies to promote water conservation cannot be put into place rapidly,
then a significant decline in irrigated acreage may occur in the Hai and downstream portion of
the Huang river basins.  This would result in shortfall in production and higher levels of imports,
particularly for wheat and also for cotton.  The extent to which imports will rise in response to
production shortfalls will also depend on China’s agricultural trade regime, which is expected to
liberalize as it adapts to its membership in WTO.  If water policy reforms are successful,
however, then there is substantial capacity for China to adapt and avert a dramatic decrease in
irrigated acreage.  Some policies, however, may not only allow China to maintain irrigated
acreage, but also induce movement into high-value horticultural products.References
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Supply and Trade”, Environment and Planning A, v.33:  79-95.Table 1.  Previous Studies into the Effects of Water Scarcity on China’s Agricultural Trade
Reference Modeling Approach Conclusions
Brown and Heilwell
(1998)
Cites modeling sponsored by the US National
Intelligence Council
China imports 175 mmt grain by 2025, and over
200 mmt by 2030
Heilig, Fischer and Van
Velthuizen
(2000)
Use hydro-climatic model to show that
agricultural production is sustainable at current
levels and with current technology, but will not
keep up with increases in demand.
Find China will produce roughly 156 mmt less
than estimated demand in 2025 with current
irrigation levels, but has a maximum production
potential of 22 mmt above the estimated demand
in 2025 if irrigation is expanded.
Yang and Zender
(2001)
Extrapolate from current trends of water use and
increases in water use efficiency.
Recommends China import 10 mmt of wheat to
relieve over-exploitation of water
Rosegrant and Cai
(2002)
Use hydrological-economic model linked to
IFPRI’s IMPACT model to estimate how changes
in water prices and water use efficiency in China
affect international trade.
Find that China will import 56.7 mmt of grain in
2025 if water prices are tripled, 9.5 mmt higher
than the baseline of 47.2 mmt (without raising
water prices).  Imports fall to 46.3 mmt if water
use efficiency increases and water prices rise.Table 2.  Decrease in Irrigated Area in North China Under 3 Scenarios*
Commodities Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(10000 hectares)
Wheat 268 911 2040
Corn 248 737 1418
Cotton   31 118  282
* The three scenarios are 1) Hebei loses 10 percent of irrigated area; 2) Hebei loses 20
percent of irrigated area and Shandong loses 10 percent; 3) Hebei Province loses 30
percent, Shandong uses 20 percent and Henan loses 10 percent.  Sown area is in 1,000
hectares, production and net imports are in million metric tons.Table 3.  Changes in China’s Production, Consumption and Trade Under 3 Water Shortage Scenarios
Base Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(quantity change from base) (percent change from base)
Wheat
Area (1000 ha) 26288 -204 -695 -1565 -0.8 -2.6 -6.0
Production (mmt) 102.8 -1.0 -3.4 -7.8 -1.0 -3.3 -7.5
Consumption (mmt) 105.7 -0.7 -2.4 -5.6 -0.7 -2.3 -5.3
Net Imports (mmt) 1.89 0.3 1.0 2.2 15.4 52.8 114.7
Stocks (mmt) 60.1 -0.2 -0.7 -1.6 -0.3 -1.2 -2.7
Corn
Area (1000 ha) 24987 -16 -49 -93 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Production (mmt) 134.7 -0.3 -0.8 -1.6 -0.2 -0.6 -1.2
Consumption (mmt) 129.1 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9
Net Imports (mmt) -3.9 0.09 0.3 0.5 2.2 6.7 12.3
Stocks (mmt) 60.0 -0.05 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5
Cotton
Area (1000 ha) 4418 -25 -93 -220 -0.6 -2.1 -5.0
Production (tmt) 4744 -21 -82 -192 -0.4 -1.7 -4.0
Consumption (tmt) 5373 -7 -25 -58 -0.1 -0.5 -1.1
Net Imports (tmt) 653 15 56 134 2.2 8.6 20.5
Stocks (tmt) 2579 -1 -5 -11 -0.04 -0.2 -0.4
*Estimates were generated by the authors using the China model that is used in annual USDA Baseline estimates.  The three scenarios
are 1) Hebei loses 10 percent of irrigated area; 2) Hebei loses 20 percent of irrigated area and Shandong loses 10 percent; 3) Hebei
Province loses 30 percent, Shandong uses 20 percent and Henan loses 10 percent.  Sown area is in 1,000 hectares, production and net
imports are in million metric tons.Table 4.  Changes in Domestic and International Prices that Result from Scenario 3
Commodities Farm Price Consumer Price International Price
(percentage change from Base under scenario 3)
Wheat 18.0 16.7 1.0
Corn 1.5 1.5 0.4
Cotton 6.8 6.8 1.3Appendix 1.  The China Model and CCLS
This study uses the Country-Commodity Linked System of models developed at USDA’s
Economic Research Service.  The system contains 42 foreign countries and regional models, and
the Food and Agricultural Policy Simulator (Fapsim) model of U.S. agriculture.  The country
models account for policies and institutional behavior such as tariffs, subsidies, and trade
restrictions. A rest-of-world model handles any missing country-commodity coverage.  In
general, production, consumption, imports, and exports in the models depend on world prices
(determined by the system), on macroeconomic projections (determined outside the system) and
on domestic and trade policies (determined inside and outside the models).  The CCLS is large,
containing about 18,000 equations per year of projection, and incorporates an extensive amount
of USDA country and commodity analysts’ expertise.
The China model used in this analysis incorporates behavior of state trading enterprises (STE’s)
and WTO commitments (such as tariff-rate quotas) into import and export equations for each
commodity.  The model consists of six different regions, which are aggregated by provinces with
similar agriculture production. The six regions include northeast, north, northwest, east, central,
south.  World price signals enter the domestic market only to the extent that these STE
influenced trade equations respond.  China’s domestic prices adjust until suppliers make
available just as much as users will want to buy.
Fapsim is an annual econometric model of U.S. agriculture whose structure reflects economic
theory and institutional knowledge of the sector.  The model contains over 700 equations that
describe supply, use, prices, and policies, such as commodity loan rates and marketing loans.The system reaches simultaneous equilibrium in prices and quantities for 24 world commodities
markets for each of the 10 projected years in the Baseline analysis.  The 24 commodity markets
include coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, and other coarse grains); food grains (wheat and
rice); soybeans, rapeseed, sunseed, and other oilseeds (and their corresponding meals and oils);
other crops (cotton and sugar); and animal products (beef and veal, pork, poultry and eggs).Appendix 2 Water Scarcity Scenarios
To model the water scarcity scenarios in northern China, we divided cultivated area into irrigated
and non-irrigated area for wheat, cotton, and corn in the northern region using statistics for
effectively irrigated area reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics.  We then assumed
yields for both irrigated and non-irrigated land for each crop based on a variety of sources, and
modified these yields so that the average, weighted by the irrigated-non-irrigated area matched
the yields used in the 2003 Baseline projections.  The assumed irrigated and non-irrigated yields
for the three commodities are reported in table 1a.
With the model modified as outlined above, we run three separate scenarios:  Scenerio 1) Hebei
loses 10 percent of its irrigated acreage; Scenario 2) Hebei loses 20 percent of its irrigated
acreage and Shandong loses 10 percent and; 3) Hebei loses 30 percent of its irrigated acreage,
Shandong loses 20 percent and Henan loses 10 percent.  A decrease in irrigated area planted to
wheat, corn, and cotton is applied in the model for each year of the projection for the three
scenarios.  The available irrigated area reduced in scenario one is 268, 248, and 31 thousand
hectares for wheat, corn, and cotton respectively.  In scenario two irrigated area is decreased by
911, 737, and 118 thousand hectares for wheat, corn, and cotton respectively.  In scenario three
irrigated area is decreased by 2046, 1446, and 284 thousand hectares for wheat, corn and cotton.
The decrease in irrigated area is maintained each year for these crops in the northern region
throughout the scenario.  Wheat and cotton has only marginal subsitiution to non-irrigated area,
but we constrian corn so that 95 percent of decreases in irrigated corn area will become non-
irrigated, since corn was traditionally grown in this area even before irrigation and can do well
with just rainfall.  This accounts for small decrease in corn area in the results.Table 1a.  Yield by average 5 years is base
Wheat Corn Cotton
North 4.75 5.22 0.92
Non-Irrigated 3.59 4.65 0.61
Irrigated 5.48 5.58 1.07